(Bloomberg) -- US President Joe Biden is scheduled to host a summit Sept. 21 of the leaders of “the Quad.” The informal grouping brings together the US, Japan, India and Australia in an alliance of democracies with shared economic and security interests that span the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The point officially is to maintain a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” but the unstated priority is countering China’s growing power. Unsurprisingly, that rankles the leadership in Beijing. The Quad has its critics, who question the group’s sometimes-ambiguous goals and ask how effective it can be given that some members are wary of provoking China. Still, it’s set to become more relevant as US-China tensions persist.
Why are we talking about it?
The group has gathered some momentum under Biden’s administration. Quad leaders have held five virtual or in-person summits during his presidency, the most recent one on the sidelines of the Group of Seven meeting in Hiroshima, Japan in May 2023. It wasn’t always so active. It lay dormant for years before being revived in 2017 by the US under then-President Donald Trump, whose government was intent on confronting China. Yet Trump’s erratic diplomacy left some allies hesitant to line up behind the US on China. When Biden replaced Trump, he pledged to work more closely with allies while continuing a tough stance on China.
What are the group’s origins?
After the four nations formed a “core group” that helped coordinate relief operations following the devastating Boxing Day tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004, Shinzo Abe, who was then Japan’s prime minister, called for a more formal, so-called Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007. That year, the group met on the sidelines of the annual Asia-Pacific forum convened by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The same year, the Quad nations plus Singapore participated in an expanded version of the Malabar naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal, which normally engage US and Indian forces. But after a promising start, the Quad effectively fell apart the next year amid concerns about alienating China.
Yet by 2017, with nationalist governments in power in Japan and India, circumstances had changed again. Before Biden came to power, China had engaged in a bloody spat with India on their disputed Himalayan border and launched punishing trade measures against Australia for proposing an investigation into the origins of the coronavirus that causes Covid-19, which was first detected in the Chinese city of Wuhan. Beijing’s growing assertiveness has not just driven the US and India closer together, but has fueled New Delhi’s interest in the Quad, according to one US official.
What does China say about the Quad?
China has lambasted the Quad as a mechanism to contain its global rise. China’s Foreign Ministry has accused the group of being dedicated to undermining China’s interests. In 2023, then-ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said the group “is steeped in the obsolete Cold War and zero sum mentality and reeks of military confrontation,” adding that it “runs counter to the trend of the times and is doomed to be rejected.”
What do other critics say?
Some have accused the Quad of being a talking shop that nevertheless cannot speak with one voice and that lacks any real institutional structure, according to a Congressional Research Service report. Others fear it could eventually morph into an Asian NATO that would provoke a Chinese response. Indian officials have been both wary of poking China and skeptical of Australia’s heretofore close ties with Beijing, writes Tanvi Madan, a senior fellow with the Brookings Institution. In a symbolic move in 2020, however, India appeared to overcome its hesitation and invited Australia to again join the Malabar exercises.
What is the Quad’s agenda?
At their summit in Tokyo in May 2022, the leaders issued a statement promising a “free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient,” signaling an intent to act on an array of pressing global challenges. That includes big issues like climate change and cyber security as well as specific domains such as cooperation on infrastructure — a likely riposte to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative. That campaign has helped build roads and power stations across Asia but has been the subject of heavy criticism, including accusations that China is luring poor countries into debt traps. However, the Quad’s infrastructure efforts have made little dent against China’s presence across Asia.
Even as the Quad remains cautious of triggering Beijing, it’s just part of a still-emerging approach to Asia: In 2021, the UK and US struck a separate defense accord with Australia — known as Aukus — to equip that country with nuclear submarines, a development that came after China’s pressure campaign against it.
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